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Influence-Dilution Claims Under the
Voting Rights Act
Beth A. Levenet
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ('VRA")1 creates a claim
for citizens when a voting practice or standard abridges their
right to vote on account of race. To prove a violation of the VRA,
plaintiffs must show, "based on the totality of circumstances,"
that "the political processes ...

are not equally open to participa-

tion by [their minority group] in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."2
Where a state draws its district lines can violate the VRA by
dividing or aggregating a minority group's votes in ways that
dilute their impact. The clearest example of vote dilution is an
"ability-to-elect" claim-a claim that the current districting
scheme prevents minorities from electing their candidate of
choice by ensuring that minorities do not constitute a majority in
any district. If a white majority always votes against the racial
minority's candidate, the minority group will require a majority
in the district to succeed in electing that candidate.
Districting also can dilute a minority group's ability to
influence an election. For example, a minority group comprising
40 percent of one district probably exerts more influence over a
candidate's platform than a fragmented group comprising only 10
percent of four districts. Fragmenting a minority group therefore
may deny it both the ability to participate meaningfully in the
political process and the ability to ensure that candidates address
its interests.3

t B.A. 1992, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Chicago.
1 42 USC § 1973 (1988).
2 42 USC § 1973(b) (1988).
' The distinction between the ability to elect and the ability to influence elections is
actually not so clear. Voters who constitute less than 50 percent of a district may still be
able to elect candidates of their choice with sufficient crossover votes. Moreover, voters
who constitute more than 50 percent of a district may be unable to elect candidates of
their choice because of a lack of voter turnout or a lack of cohesiveness. See J. Morgan
Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districtsand the Pragmatic Traditionin Voting Rights
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Although there is some disagreement among courts, most
have concluded that VRA claims are not cognizable if the minority group cannot constitute more than 50 percent of a singlemember district.4 This adherence to a majority requirement reflects some courts' affinity for a bright-line rule. Although there
is a legitimate need for a workable standard for assessing influence-dilution claims, a simple bright-line rule cannot appropriately balance judicial efficiency and the need to redress injuries to
political participation.

This Comment shows that courts can adopt flexible, but
workable, standards for assessing whether plaintiffs have stated
a legitimate influence-dilution claim under the VRA. In part I,
this Comment describes how courts have treated influence-dilution claims to date. This part illustrates that most courts reject
such claims because they require plaintiffs to show that the
minority group could constitute a majority in a single-member
district, a bright-line rule that precludes influence-dilution
claims. Many courts fear that without such a rule, there would be
Law, 27 USF L Rev 551, 563-65 (1993). See also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 89-90 n
1 (1986)(O'Connor concurring).
This Comment defines an ability-to-elect claim as a claim seeking to create a majority-minority district, that is, a district where minorities constitute more than 50 percent of
the population. Influence-dilution claims are defined as claims where it would be impossible to create such districts. Consequently, this Comment labels as 'influence districts'
those districts in which minority voters constitute less than 50 percent of the population,
but are able to attain crossover votes in support of their preferred candidates. In such
districts, minorities may actually be able to elect candidates of their choice despite constituting less than 50 percent of the district. These districts indicate that requiring plaintiffs
to be able to constitute a majority-minority district is inappropriate for both vote-dilution
and influence-dilution claims. However, this Comment shows that influence-dilution
claims, where no majority-minority district is possible, should be cognizable even though
courts may still require the creation of majority-minority districts in ability-to-elect
claims. Of course, if influence claims are allowed, it would no longer make sense to
require majority-minority districts in ability-to-elect claims. It would certainly be ironic to
allow a claim where plaintiffs could prove the requisite increase in influence with, for
example, forty percent of the population of a proposed district, but then to bar a claim,
based on a majority requirement, by plaintiffs who could prove an ability to elect with the
same percentage.
' See McNeil v Springfield Park Dist., 851 F2d 937, 947 (7th Cir 1988)(affirming
summary judgment in favor of defendant in challenge to city's at-large voting system for
electing park board trustees and school board members); Turner v Arkansas, 784 F Supp
553, 570-71 (E D Ark 1991)(finding that Arkansas Congressional redistricting did not
cause vote dilution in violation of the VRA); Hastert v State Bd. of Elections, 777 F Supp
634, 654 (N D Ill 1991)(refusing to recognize district with 4.9 percent African-American
voting age population as influence district in dispute over which proposed redistricting
plan court should adopt); Skorepa v City of Chula Vista, 723 F Supp 1384, 1391-92 (S D
Cal 1989)(rejecting challenge to city's at-large election system because HispanicAmericans could not comprise more than 26.1 percent of eligible voters in any singlemember district).
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a flood of litigation. In part II, this Comment argues that courts

should recognize influence-dilution claims. Not only does a legitimate injury exist, but the purpose of the VRA supports recognizing such claims. Further, the requirement that the minority
group be able to constitute a majority in a single-member district
is inappropriate.
In part III, this Comment proposes possible standards that
courts can use to recognize influence-dilution claims, then defends those standards against arguments for retaining a brightline rule. First, plaintiffs would have to show that they are a
cohesive and geographically compact minority group that has
been split by district lines. Second, plaintiffs would be required to
demonstrate that white bloc voting usually defeats candidates
who represent minority interests, or that minority influence is so
negligible that minority interests are defeated even without a
white bloc. Third, plaintiffs would need to show that redistricting
would provide their group with a demonstrable increase in
influence over candidates currently unresponsive to minority
interests. Finally, plaintiffs would have to prove that redistricting would advance minority interests on the whole, taking into
account that redistricting may diminish the influence of minorities in some districts.
I. THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE-DILUTION CLAIMS REMAINS
UNRESOLVED

Courts have not yet definitively resolved whether influencedilution claims are cognizable under the VRA; the Supreme
Court has repeatedly deferred addressing this issue and the lower federal courts are currently divided. Although a few circuits
have recognized such claims,5 most have rejected them.6 Courts
generally have rejected such claims because they desire a brightline rule that separates valid claims from marginal ones-such as
a requirement that the group could constitute a majority in a
single-member district.7

See Garza v County of Los Angeles, 918 F2d 763, 770-71 (9th Cir 1990); Armour v
Ohio, 775 F Supp 1044, 1059-60 (N D Ohio 1991).
6 See McNeil v Springfield Park Dist., 851 F2d 937, 947 (7th Cir 1988); Turner v
Arkansas, 784 F Supp 553, 570-71 (E D Ark 1991); Hastert v State Bd. of Elections, 777 F
Supp 634, 654 (N D Ill 1991); Skorepa v City of Chula Vista, 723 F Supp 1384, 1391-92 (S
D Cal 1989).
' See McNeil, 851 F2d at 947; Hastert, 777 F Supp at 653; Skorepa, 723 F Supp at
1391-92.
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The Supreme Court Has Deferred Addressing the Issue

The Supreme Court first deferred judgment of the influencedistrict issue in Thornburg v Gingles.' In Gingles, the Supreme
Court addressed a claim that a multimember districting scheme
violated the VRA by reducing plaintiffs' ability to elect candidates
of their choice. Although the Court recognized the need to evaluate VRA claims based on the "totality of the circumstances," it
concluded that there are limits to when a legitimate injury can
be proven.9 Consequently, the Court set out a tripartite threshold test to determine if a challenged districting scheme impaired
plaintiffs' ability to elect their preferred representatives. 0 Under this test, plaintiffs must demonstrate that: (1) "the minority
group... is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2) "the minority
group... is politically cohesive"; and (3) "the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.""
The Gingles Court, however, did not intend these three requirements to apply to claims of an impaired ability to influence
elections. 2 It explicitly limited its holding to cases where plaintiffs claimed an impaired ability to elect:
We have no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits,
and if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim

8 478 US 30 (1986).
' Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US at 46.
'0 Id at 50-51.
1 Id (citations omitted). The requirements of racial bloc voting and political cohesiveness stem from the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to the VRA, which lists racial
polarization as one of a number of factors that may be relevant to a VRA claim. Voting
Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 28-29 (1982). The Supreme
Court required these particular factors because they are necessary to prove that the
districting thwarts distinct minority interests because of race. Gingles, 478 US at 51. The
majority requirement, however, did not stem from the Senate Report but was added to
ensure that a causal connection existed. The Court explained that if minority voters could
not constitute a majority in a single-member district "the multimember form of the

district cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect its candidates." Id at
50 (emphasis omitted). In other words, if redistricting would not enable minority voters to
elect candidates of their choice, the challenged districting could not have caused minority
voters' inability to elect.
12 Gingles, 478 US at 46-47 n 12.
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brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently
large and compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district, alleging that the use of a multimember
district impairs its ability to influence elections. 3

The Court later applied the same three conditions to
ability-to-elect claims challenging single-member districts, 14 but
continued to defer the question of whether a claim could be stated alleging impairment of minority voters' ability to influence
elections. 5 Although the Court has summarily affirmed certain
cases addressing the7 issue,1 6 it recently noted that the question
was still undecided.1
District and Appellate Courts Are Split

B.

Most lower federal courts have rejected influence-dilution
claims. At least one court reasoned that influence-dilution claims
cannot satisfy the Gingles requirement that white bloc voting
exist. s According to the court in Turner v Arkansas,9 if the
white majority votes as a bloc, then the minority will be unable
to exert any influence on the candidates because minority votes
are not needed for the white bloc to win. On the other hand, if
the minority can exert some influence or is able to attract some
crossover votes with less than 50 percent of the population, white
bloc voting does not exist.2 ° Therefore, the minority plaintiffs do
not meet the third prong of the Gingles test.2 '

Id at 46 n 12 (emphasis in original).
Growe v Emison, 113 S Ct 1075, 1084 (1993)(reversing district court holding that
Minnesota state court's legislative plan violated the VRA).
" Id at 1084-85 n 5. See also Voinovich v Quilter, 113 S Ct 1149, 1157 (1993)(stating,
"Of course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the
'4

nature of the claim. For example, the first Gingles precondition, the requirement that the
group be sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to be
modified or eliminated when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume arguendo
to be actionable today.").
See Turner, 112 S Ct at 2296, affirming 784 F Supp 553 (E D Ark 1991).
,7 Johnson v De Grandy, 114 S Ct 2647, 2656 (1994)(resolving vote-dilution case

without deciding "whether the first Gingles condition can be satisfied by proof that a socalled influence district may be created (that is, by proof that plaintiffs can devise an

additional district in which members of a minority group are a minority of the voters, but
a potentially influential one).").
1 Turner, 784 F Supp at 570-71.
" Id at 570-71.

'0 Id.
21

Id.
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Most courts, however, have rejected influence-dilution claims
based on a mechanical application of the Gingles requirement
that the minority group be able to constitute a majority in a
single-member district. Influence claims are inherently invalid
under this majority requirement because such claims do not seek
to create majority-minority districts.22 Courts have argued that
the majority requirement is necessary for two reasons. First,
without a bright line dividing legitimate from illegitimate claims,
a flood of frivolous suits would ensue." In the words of one
court, "an unrestricted breach of the Gingles single-district majority precondition will likely open a Pandora's box of marginal
Voting Rights Act claims by minority groups of all sizes." 24 As a
consequence, judicial economy mandates drawing a line. In addition, these courts have argued that the subsequent flood of litigation would make it more difficult for courts to hear legitimate
claims. 2' The judicial economy provided by a bright-line rule
better enables courts to redress the most substantial injuries.
Second, these courts have argued that without a bright-line
rule, they will have no objective way to determine when a cognizable injury exists.26 Without this determination it is impossible
to decide when plaintiffs have stated a valid claim.27 What is
more, because voting-rights claims are usually fact intensive,
they are inherently difficult to assess. Therefore, the courts have
reasoned, the Gingles preconditions are the only means available
to reach rational outcomes. 28 A line at the 50 percent mark is
reasonable because of its presumed relationship to the ability to
elect. 29 The court in Hastert v State Board of Elections ° expressed the typical view of most courts on this issue:

See Martin v Allain, 658 F Supp 1183, 1204 (S D Miss 1987)(rejecting influence
claims, stating no valid VRA claim exists unless Gingles majority requirement satisfied);
Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654 (recognizing that majority requirement would prevent courts
from rectifying influence dilution).
23 See McNeil, 851 F2d at 947; Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654; Skorepa, 723 F Supp at
1391-92.
24 Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654.
25 Id.
21 See McNeil, 851 F2d at 942-44; Hastert, 777 F Supp at 653-54.
27 See McNeil, 851 F2d at 942-44; Hastert, 777 F Supp at 653-54.
21 See McNeil, 851 F2d at 942-44; Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654.
29 It is disputed, however, whether such a clear relationship actually exists. See J.
Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in
Voting Rights Law, 27 USF L Rev 551, 563-65 (1993)(cited in note 3).
"0 777 F Supp 634 (N D Ill 1991).
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Where the minority voters could not constitute a singlemember district majority, injury becomes a more elusive
and subjective concept. It is only through the electoral
majority precondition that courts are possessed of a
"clear measure of [ ] voting strength, hence a fair and
workable standard by which to measure dilution of the
strength."31
Even the two courts that have recognized VRA claims where
the minority group was unable to form a majority in a singlemember district have explicitly refused to decide whether influence-dilution claims are generally cognizable, perhaps fearing
that recognizing such claims would create a flood of litigation. 2
In Garza v County of Los Angeles,33 the court allowed an influence claim, but limited its holding to cases where plaintiffs can
show intentional discrimination in the creation of the districts. In
Garza, the county "intentionally fragmented the [Hispanic-American] population among the various districts in order to dilute the
effect of the [Hispanic-American] vote .

. . ."'

The Garza court

held that it was not relevant that a majority-minority district
could not have been drawn; the Gingles majority requirement
cannot be applied in the face of intentional dilution of minority
voting strength.3"
The Garza court's solution, however, is contrary to legislative
intent. Congress specifically amended the VRA to clarify that
plaintiffs need only show discriminatory results, not discriminatory intent, to prove a violation of the VRA. 6 Limiting influence-dilution claims to cases of intentional discrimination may
allay fears that frivolous suits will flood the courts; however, the
VRA itself indicates that it is improper for courts to require
plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent. 7
The court in Armour v Ohio" also refused to apply the
Gingles majority requirement. The Armour court found that the

31 Id at 653 (internal citation omitted).

3' Garza, 918 F2d at 769; Armour, 775 F Supp at 1059 n 19. Note, however, that only
the Garza court addressed the issue as an influence claim. The Armour court addressed
the issue as an ability-to-elect claim, despite the group's inability to constitute a majority
in a single-member district.
918 F2d at 763.
Id at 769.
"

Id.

37

S Rep No 97-417 at 2 (1982)(cited in note 11).
Id.
775 F Supp at 1044.

3'
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plaintiffs stated a claim for vote dilution despite their inability to
constitute a majority in a single-member district. While it might
have been framed as an influence claim, the Armour court addressed plaintiffs' argument as an inability-to-elect claim. 9 The
Armour court found that both parties tended to direct their campaigns towards the wealthy suburban white "swing vote."' As a
result of this swing vote, candidates had little incentive to take
positions responsive to the impoverished, urban, African-American community. Representatives were perceived as being indifferent to minority interests.4 1 Under the minority-proposed redistricting, however, African-Americans would have constituted onethird of the voting age population, about half of the usual Democratic vote. They would therefore have wielded enough influence
that "the Democratic Party and its candidates [would] be forced
to be sensitive to the minority population by virtue of that
population's size. " "
The result of redistricting in Armour seems to be an increased ability to influence, rather than control, elections. The
Armour court, however, shied away from recognizing the influence claims, holding that "[s]ince [African-American] voters consistently vote eighty to ninety per cent [sic] Democratic and
white voters vote consistently almost fifty per cent [sic] Democratic, we find that plaintiffs could elect a candidate of their
choice, although not necessarily of their race, in a reconfigured
district."' Despite this language, there was no finding that African-Americans could control the primary to nominate the candi-

Id at 1059 n 19.
40 Id at 1059. The evidence demonstrated that there was very little campaigning
directed towards the African-American community. This was based on surveys and certain
actions by representatives who did not seek African-American community input. Id at
1058.
Armour, 775 F Supp at 1059.
42 Id at 1060. This represents an increase of approximately 8 percent. In the challenged scheme, African-Americans constituted 11.11 percent of one district and 24.96 percent of another. This scheme effectively split the African-American population at its greatest concentration to create two districts with a ratio of 35:65. Id at 1047. In the proposed
district, 99 percent of the African-American residents would be in one district. Id at 1048.
,3 Armour, 775 F Supp at 1060.

INFLUENCE-DILUTION CLAIMS

4571

date of their choosing.' Nor was there any showing that, if African-Americans did control the Democratic primary, the Democratic candidate would be able to retain the white support necessary to win the election.'
The above cases are the exception to the rule. Courts generally apply the Gingles preconditions to preclude influence-dilution
claims. As this Comment demonstrates, however, courts should
recognize such claims and apply different standards to assess
their validity.
II. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE INFLUENCE-DILUTION CLAIMS

Minority groups suffer real harm from dilutive districting,
even when they are unable to constitute a majority in a singlemember district. This is especially clear in cases such as Garza v
County of Los Angeles" and Armour v Ohio,47 where the states
intended their districting schemes to deprive minorities of influence." Even the court in Hastert v State Board of Elections,49
which refused to recognize influence-dilution claims, admitted
that "[the Gingles precondition does prevent sizable minority
groups from attempting to rectify electoral practices that dilute
their votes and impair their ability to participate in the political
process.""
The issue, however, is not whether the minority group suffers harm from these practices, but whether the VRA establishes

Indeed, the fact that the Armour court explicitly stated that plaintiffs would probably not be able to elect candidates of their race seems to indicate that this is not an
ability-to-elect claim. Furthermore, such a finding would involve analyses not undertaken
by the court, for example, an analysis of minority voter turnout in primaries.
" If an influence-dilution claim is defined as a redistricting claim where the minority
group cannot constitute a majority in a single-member district, then the claim in Armour
is an influence-dilution claim, not an ability-to-elect claim. See note 3. The Armour court's
characterization of it as an ability-to-elect claim is understandable, however, if the ability
to elect is seen as a continuum. Whereas prior to redistricting the Armour plaintiffs could
not elect their preferred representatives, after redistricting they could have either more
ability to elect their preferred candidates or a new ability to elect more preferred candidates. While this understanding may shed some light on the court's characterization of
the suit as an ability-to-elect claim, it destroys the distinction between ability-to-elect and
influence claims. Once the bright line between the two claims is eliminated, courts cannot
reject influence-dilution claims solely on the ground that no bright line demarcates which
claims are invalid. Such a line would not exist for ability-to-elect claims, either.
918 F2d 763 (9th Cir 1990).
'7 775 F Supp 1044 (N D Ohio 1991).
See Garza v County of Los Angeles, 918 F2d 763, 769 (9th Cir 1990); Armour v
Ohio, 775 F Supp 1044, 1060 (N D Ohio 1991).
9 777 F Supp 634 (N D Ill 1991).
'o

Id at 654.
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this harm as a legally cognizable injury. Although most courts
have refused as a matter of law to recognize influence claims, the
VRA does not mandate this outcome. The VRA and its legislative
history are ambiguous; 51 they do not clearly preclude influence

claims.52 To the contrary, both the legislative history of the VRA
and the text of the statute support recognizing such claims.53
Nor did the Gingles Court preclude recognizing influence-dilution
claims. The Supreme Court has not only repeatedly deferred
addressing the issue, but it has also expressed the view that
courts should not apply the Gingles preconditions mechanically,
without regard to the nature of the claim.5 4
Most of the arguments for application of the Gingles preconditions to preclude influence claims are based on a policy favoring bright-line rules. 5 Courts understandably want to avoid a
flood of litigation and marginal claims. However, a more flexible
approach, such as the one proposed below, can address these
concerns and is more consistent with statutory intent.56
A.

The Purpose of the VRA Supports Recognizing InfluenceDilution Claims

A voting practice or procedure violates the VRA if it causes
minority-group citizens to have "less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice."57 This language neither clearly sanctions nor clearly forecloses influence claims.5"
" For example, the statute describes the harm as existing when minorities have "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 USC § 1973(b) (1988). This language gives
no clear indication of whether influence-dilution claims are cognizable.
" See Hastert, 777 F Supp at 653 (noting that Section 2 of the VRA, "as worded,"
does not preclude VRA claims by minority groups unable to constitute a majority in a
single-member district).
See notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
See Voinovich v Quilter, 113 S Ct 1149, 1157 (1993).
See Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654 ("The Gingles precondition does prevent sizable minority groups from attempting to rectify electoral practices that dilute their votes and
impair their ability to participate in the political process. However, the electoral majority
precondition ensures that larger minority groups with equally meritorious but broader
scale claims will not have to compete with myriad marginal [VRA] claimants likely to jam
the courthouse door in the abstnce of an electoral majority precondition.")(citations omitted).
56 See Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 28-29, 31
(1982)(cited in note 11).
5' 42 USC § 1973(b).
" Even the Hastert court, which refused to recognize influence-dilution claims,
admitted that the statutory language was open to recognizing such claims, stating that
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In addition, the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments to
the VRA sheds little light on this issue because it does not directly address the issue of influence claims.
The legislative history does indicate, however, that Congress
was concerned with ensuring that minority groups are able to
participate meaningfully in politics, not just that they are able to
elect candidates of their choice where they are sufficiently numerous to do so. 5 1 In discussing VRA violations, Congress usual-

ly referred only to participation in the political processes, not to
the ability to elect preferred representatives.60 For example, the
Senate Report states that "the issue to be decided under the
results test is whether the political processes are equally open to
minority voters."61 Furthermore, the Senate Report repeatedly
describes practices that violate the VRA as those that "operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population." 2 It seems unlikely that Congress would use the term "minimize" if it meant only to abolish
practices that effectively eliminated minority groups' ability to
elect candidates of their choice. Either a group can elect its preferred candidate or it cannot. The ability either exists or does not
exist-it cannot be minimized. 3
Furthermore, in discussing the meaning of the right to vote,
the Senate Report does not focus exclusively on the ability to
elect one's chosen candidate, but instead conceives of voting power as a matter of degree. The Report accepts the Supreme Court's
observation that "[t]he right to vote.. . includes the right to have
the vote counted at full value without dilution or discount."64
Practices that operate "to minimize or cancel out the voting

"[t]here is little doubt that the 'participation' provision, as worded, may accommodate a
construction that would permit § 2 claims by minority groups lacking a single-district
electoral majority." Hastert, 777 F Supp at 653.
"9 S Rep No 97-417 at 29 n 115 (cited in note 11).
'0 Id at 2, 16, 28, 30.
" Id at 2. This language echoes the case the 1982 Amendments intended to codify,
White v Regester, 412 US 755, 766 (1973)(stating that in a VRA case "[tihe plaintiffs'
burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice")(citation omitted)(emphasis added). Id at 2, 28.
62 See S Rep No 97-417 at 23, 28 (cited in note 11).
It is possible that the term "minimizing" refers to voting practices other than
districting, such as ballot procedures. More likely, however, this was meant specifically to
apply to redistricting cases, since it was taken from vote-dilution cases. Id at 20, 23.
" Id at 19, quoting Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 555 n 29 (1964).
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strength and political effectiveness of minority groups [I are an
impermissible denial of the right to have one's vote fully
count." 5
"Political effectiveness," however, not only includes the power
to elect, but also includes the ability to use a group's voting
strength to persuade candidates to address particular issues. In
fact, the ability to use its votes to ensure that candidates address
at least some of its interests is central to a group's ability to
attain representation. Although the minority group may not be
able to use its collective votes to elect its ideal candidate, the
group can use its votes to make sure that the candidates who are
running take a particular approach to certain issues. In this way,
the ability to influence elections is an important part of the power of the vote and the ability to participate in the political process.
Thus, the lack of a "minority candidate," someone who is
clearly identified as representative of that group's interests,
should not shut minority voters out of the political process. Even
if a minority group cannot elect its own candidate, its votes are
meaningless only if the districting deprives it of the ability to
take part in the process that shapes candidates' platforms and
subsequent actions in office. According to this understanding of
political participation, a dilution of influence would clearly violate minority voting rights under the VRA.
Section 2 of the VRA defines a violation as an act that reduces the opportunity for minorities "to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."6 6 Although
one might argue that plaintiffs must demonstrate both factors to
state a claim under the VRA, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Chisom v Roemer67 implies that simply showing an impaired
ability to participate is sufficient, further indicating that influence claims are cognizable under the VRA."8 In Chisom, the
Court held that it was not sufficient for plaintiffs to show a lessened opportunity to elect candidates of their choice without also
showing that they had less opportunity to participate in the political process.69 The Court did not state whether showing a lessened opportunity to participate would be sufficient to state a

'

S Rep No 97-417 at 28 (cited in note 11).

42 USC § 1973(b).
6'

501 US 380 (1991).

' See Armour, 775 F Supp at 1052 (interpreting Chisom v Roemer to imply that
influence-dilution claims are cognizable under the VRA).

Chisom, 501 US at 397.
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457]

claim without proof of an inability to elect. It implied, however,
that such a showing would be sufficient.7 ° The Court stated that
"[a]ny abridgment of the opportunity of members of a protected
class to participate in the political process inevitably impairs
their ability to influence the outcome of an election."71 This
statement implicitly recognizes that an impaired ability to influence an election would violate the VRA.
The majority's response to Justice Scalia's dissent also implies that influence claims are cognizable under the VRA. Justice
Scalia pointed out that if the majority opinion in Chisom requires
plaintiffs to show an inability to elect candidates of their choice
in addition to an impaired ability to participate in political processes, the opinion would foreclose the possibility of influence
claims. 7' He interpreted the majority opinion to require both
showings, and argued that this dual requirement would leave
minority groups who could not constitute a majority in a singlemember district "entirely without § 2 protection." 73 As a consequence, "a protected class that with or without the [voting] practice will be unable to elect its candidate can be denied equal
opportunity 'to participate in the political process' with impunity."7U The majority responded to Justice Scalia by asserting that

his argument "rest[ed] on the erroneous assumption that a small
group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election, 75
implying that influence claims could be cognizable, even when
brought by a group constituting less than a majority.
B. The Gingles Preconditions Do Not Apply to Influence Claims
Influence claims are inherently different than the claim
before the Court in Gingles. The Court designed the Gingles
preconditions to determine when challenged districting makes a
group unable to elect its preferred candidates. 76 They were not
designed to determine when districting has injured a group's
ability to influence elections. In the first case, it makes perfect

70 Id.
71

Id.

Id at 409 (Scalia dissenting).
73 Chisom, 501 US at 409 (Scalia dissenting).
7, Id (Scalia dissenting).
' Id at 397 n 24.
7' Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 50 n 17 (1986)(pointing out that if plaintiffs could
not elect their preferred candidates under a redistricting scheme, then the plaintiffs have
failed to show that the challenged districting scheme caused the claimed injury: harm to
the group's ability to elect).
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sense to require plaintiffs to show that, but for the challenged
practice, they would have been able to elect candidates of their
choice. But where the injury claimed is not an inability to elect a
group's preferred candidates, there is no obvious reason why
plaintiffs should have to show they could have elected their candidates of choice in the absence of the challenged practice.
Of course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the nature of the
claim. For example, the first Gingles precondition, the
requirement that the group be sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to be
modified or eliminated when analyzing the influencedilution
claim we assume arguendo to be actionable to77
day.
Given this admonition, courts should not mechanically apply the
Gingles preconditions to preclude influence-dilution claims.m
C.

A Bright-Line Rule is Not Appropriate for Evaluating VRA
Claims

Congress did not intend for there to be a bright-line rule for
VRA cases.79 Statutory language explicitly states that courts are
to determine when a voting practice violates the VRA based on
the "totality of circumstances."" ° Congress determined that this
careful consideration was necessary because "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized" in light of the fundamental importance
of voting
rights in preserving "other basic civil and political
8
rights." '

Voinovich, 113 S Ct at 1157 (emphasis added).
78 Some have argued that courts should not apply the majority cutoff mechanically
because it does not measure minority voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates, in
part because no true distinction exists between the ability to elect and the ability to
influence elections. See J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the
Pragmatic Traditionin Voting Rights Law, 27 USF L Rev 551, 563-65 (1993)(cited in note
3).
"
See 42 USC § 1973(b); S Rep No 97-417 at 19, 28, 29 (cited in note 11), quoting
Reynolds, 377 US at 562.
Furthermore, in voting rights cases, a bright line is simply impossible because, in
reality, no bright line marks when a group has the ability to elect. See Kousser, 27 USF L
Rev at 563-65 (cited in note 3).
'o 42 USC § 1973(b).
"
S Rep No 97-417 at 19 (cited in note 11), quoting Reynolds, 377 US at 562.
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Although courts may have more difficulty assessing VRA
claims without a bright-line rule, the need for judicial ease does

not justify denying relief when plaintiffs have suffered real injury
to such an important right. The results test codified by the 1982
Amendments "is not an easy test." 2 The Senate Report provided
a number of factors that would be relevant to this inquiry, and
Congress clearly intended no set formula for determining when a
voting practice violates the Act. 3 Even in ability-to-elect claims,
once the Gingles preconditions are met, courts must still analyze

the totality of the circumstances to determine if plaintiffs have
stated a valid VRA claim.8
There is a legitimate demand for standards that courts can
use to assess influence claims. However, the Gingles precondi-

S Rep No 97-417 at 31 (cited in note 11).
The Senate Report stated:
To establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a variety of factors .... Typical
factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision
is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
[8.] whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is
tenuous.
While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some
cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.
The cases demonstrate, and the Committee intends that there is no requirement
that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them
point one way or the other.
Id at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
" Johnson v De Grandy, 114 S Ct 2647, 2657 (1994).
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tions are not appropriate standards. Because Congress did not
intend courts to apply a bright-line rule to evaluate VRA claims
and because bright-line rules are poorly suited to VRA cases,
courts should find more appropriate standards to apply.
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS
Courts must often balance judicial economy against judicial
accuracy. This balance, however, must be made in light of the
gravity of the injury at issue. Where, as with influence-dilution
claims, districting endangers fundamental rights, there is good
reason for courts to sacrifice some judicial economy in favor of
accuracy. The importance of voting rights requires that courts
attempt to create workable standards to assess influence claims
so that real injuries to these rights do not go unredressed.
Although the preconditions established in Thornburg v
Gingles" should not be applied to influence-dilution claims, they
can be the basis of new standards. These new standards should
retain two prongs of the Gingles test by requiring a showing of
white bloc voting and of minority cohesiveness. As in ability-toelect claims, these prongs show that the alleged harm is race
based, as required by the VRA.
The Gingles requirement that plaintiffs be able to constitute
a majority in a single-member district, however, must be modified. In order to maintain this requirement's focus on causation,
the third prong in the proposed influence-claim standards should
determine whether the challenged practice has caused a minority
group's influence to be diluted. Plaintiffs must show that they
would have more influence under a proposed redistricting plan
than they had under the challenged plan. Additionally, plaintiffs
must show that there is a "lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group"" under the challenged districting.
A fourth prong is necessary to assess influence-dilution
claims. If redistricting increases the proportion of minorities in
one district, it will reduce the proportion of minorities in another.
Thus, plaintiffs must show that the proposed districting plan advances minority voting rights, on balance, across all affected
districts. A state can counter an influence-dilution claim by dem-

478 US 30 (1986).
Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 29 (1982)(cited
in note 11).
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onstrating that it created the challenged districting scheme to
support the voting rights of minorities in the district where the
minority population would decrease. Plaintiffs then must overcome a presumption that redistricting will actually cause harm to
minority voting power in that area.
A. The First Prong: Did the Challenged Districting
Unnecessarily Split a Cohesive Minority Group?
One of the Gingles preconditions should remain intact: that
the challenged districting plan unnecessarily split a cohesive
minority group. 7 This requirement is necessary to demonstrate
that the challenged districting has caused the dilution of minority influence or that, in the words of the Gingles Court, the dilution "thwarts distinctive minority-group interests.""8
This prong has two parts. First, the minority group must be
cohesive enough to have identifiable interests and potential influence as a group. Second, the districting must injure this political
influence by splitting a concentration of the cohesive group.
B.

The Second Prong: Does White Bloc Voting Usually Defeat
Candidates Who Represent Minority Interests, or is Minority
Influence So Negligible that No White Bloc Exists?

The standard for influence-dilution claims should also borrow
the Gingles requirement that white bloc voting play a role in the
plaintiffs' lack of influence. 9 This prong demonstrates that the

87 See J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic

Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 USF L Rev 551, 576 (1993)(cited in note 3).
'8 Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 51 (1986).
Contrary to the Turner court's analysis, which led it to conclude that influence
claims could never satisfy the requirement of white bloc voting, white bloc voting is not an
either-or proposition. See Turner v Arkansas, 784 F Supp 553, 570, 571 (E D Ark 1991).
Significantly, the Turner court defined the minority-preferred candidate to be an AfricanAmerican candidate (in accordance with plaintiffs' definition). Id at 571. Given this
definition, the Turner court's presumptions regarding the either-or nature of bloc voting
are more understandable. But in reality, bloc voting occurs on a continuum-there can be
more or less of it. The Supreme Court has recognized this to be the case. See Johnson v
De Grandy, 114 S Ct 2647, 2657 (1994); Gingles, 478 US at 55-58. For an analysis of the
effects of varying degrees of bloc voting, see, generally, Kousser, 27 USF L Rev at 551
(cited in note 3). For instance, white bloc voting could mean that 80 percent of the white
voters will vote as a bloc to defeat a minority-preferred candidate. This level of bloc voting
will defeat minority candidates in some, but not all, situations, depending on whether the
20 percent who cross over are enough to elect the minority-preferred candidate.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

474

[1995:

influence dilution is race based because it is caused by the submergence of the minority group in a white majority.
Courts should not, however, require white bloc voting in all
cases. Where the number of minority voters in a challenged district is so small that their votes are expendable, candidates will
not address minorities' interests even in the absence of white bloc
voting. The candidates will instead focus all their attention on
trying to attract the votes of the white majority. With both candidates focusing exclusively on whites, the white voters likely will
split because there would be no candidate against whom they
would vote as a bloc. Thus, plaintiffs may still satisfy this prong
by showing that the lack of a white bloc vote results from the
minority group's expendability to candidates.
Armour v Ohio9° presents a good example of the dynamics
of white bloc voting and why districting may dilute plaintiffs'
influence even though there is no white bloc.9 1 The Armour
court found that minority candidates were defeated by white bloc
voting, but when no minority candidate existed, the white vote
was split.92 The court based these findings on statistics regarding past electoral behavior. Political races in the area were partisan, with 80 to 90 percent of African-Americans consistently
voting for the Democratic candidate.9 3 About 10 percent of
whites in these races voted Republican; the rest were split between independent and Democratic candidates.9 4 In races in
which an African-American candidate ran, however, about 80
percent of African-Amercans voted for the African-American
candidate, whereas only 12 percent of whites voted for the African-American candidate.9 5 The Armour court found that, because African-American voters were safely Democratic when
there was no African-American candidate, candidates addressed
their campaigns primarily towards the wealthy white suburbanites who constituted the swing vote.9" Thus, the white vote was
split because of the absence of a candidate who represented minority interests.

0 775 F Supp 1044, 1058-60 (N D Ohio 1991).
Id.
Id at 1056-58.

"

Id at 1057 n 17.
Armour, 775 F Supp at 1056.
'

Id at 1057.

Id at 1058-59 (including, for example, evidence that there was very little campaigning directed toward the African-American community).
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Plaintiffs would not have satisfied this prong of the proposed
test if whites did not vote as a bloc against minority candidates.
Without such a bloc, plaintiffs could not have attributed their
lack of success to race. Plaintiffs' claim would also have failed if
they could not have explained the absence of a white bloc on the
grounds that no candidate represented minority interests and
that the African-American vote was dispensable.
C. The Third Prong: Do Candidates Currently Tend to be
Unresponsive and Would Redistricting Demonstrably
Increase Minority Influence?
Unlike the Gingles test for ability-to-elect claims, in influence-dilution claims, courts cannot require the minority group to
constitute a majority in a single-member district. This would
necessarily prevent any claim from succeeding. Plaintiffs making
influence-dilution claims must instead show that the challenged
districting caused the alleged dilution. That is, plaintiffs must
show that a proposed redistricting would provide greater influence to the minority group than the challenged plan allowed.97
Plaintiffs cannot rest on the assumption that more people will
mean more influence, but must bring forth proof that this is
SO.

98

Additionally, plaintiffs must show that they lack influence in
the first instance by demonstrating that representatives under
the challenged districting scheme tend to be unresponsive to
minority interests. To show a lack of responsiveness, plaintiffs
must present evidence that representatives have tended to vote
against, or without regard to, identified minority interests.

" See Kousser, 27 USF L Rev at 577 (cited in note 3). The Senate Report included
candidate responsiveness to minority interests as one of the factors relevant to establishing a violation of the VRA. S Rep No 97-417 at 29 (cited in note 11). In Gingles, the Court

recognized that, depending on the case, some Senate Factors will be more important than
others. Gingles, 478 US at 49 n 15. In cases of influence dilution, responsiveness of candidates will be among the most important considerations.
98 This assumption, though seemingly intuitive, is incorrect in the context of votingrights cases. The claim in voting-rights cases depends on the existence of racially polarized voting that skews the political process, such that numbers do not have their normal
significance in voting. For instance, if racial bloc voting consistently defeats the minoritypreferred candidate, increasing the number of minority voters will not help unless it

reaches the threshold necessary to defeat the white bloc. As long as minority voters
remain below this number, candidates have no incentive (indeed, they have a
disincentive) to address minority issues, regardless of the fact that minorities may constitute a substantial portion of the district, because if they do, they will be defeated by the
white bloc.
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The Armour case exemplifies how plaintiffs can demonstrate
increased influence. The Armour court found that, in the challenged districts, candidates were unresponsive to minority interests because the districts' racial composition created incentives
for candidates to focus only on the white swing vote.99 In the
proposed district, however, African-American voters would constitute about one-third of total voter population (as opposed to 25
percent and 11 percent in the two challenged districts), and
about half of the usual Democratic vote. 00 In addition, the proposed redistricting would move a number of white voters to another district, such that "candidates and representatives [would]
not find themselves in conflict between the interests of wealthy
suburbs and the impoverished urban communities they
serve. ""' Consequently, candidates (at least Democratic candidates) could no longer afford to ignore minority interests.0 2
Plaintiffs can use other types of evidence to show that redistricting would increase minority influence. Plaintiffs' evidence
will differ depending on the alleged cause of their lack of influence. For instance, if minority plaintiffs lack influence because
their votes are expendable (instead of being defeated by white
bloc voting), as in Armour, plaintiffs can show that the proposed
districting would increase their population to the degree necessary to command the candidates' attention. In Armour, plaintiffs
successfully demonstrated this because of the new influence they
would have over the Democratic primary. Alternatively, plaintiffs
can show that with the increased population the minority group
would become a swing vote, commanding candidates' attention so
that they can no longer ignore minority interests.0 3 Plaintiffs
might also use statistics demonstrating that a redistricting plan
would increase their population to the point where campaigns
would begin to target them.
A successful defense to a claim that minority influence is so
negligible that there is no white bloc might show that whites, if
redistricted, would begin to vote as a bloc to defeat any candidate

Armour, 775 F Supp at 1058.
'oo Id

at 1047, 1059-60.

Id at 1060.
102 Id.

13 The court in Illinois Legislative Redistricting Comm'n. v LaPaille,786 F Supp 704,
715 (N D Mll1992), noted that this argument depends upon the existence of a partisan
race. This objection presents little difficulty since bipartisan races are the reality in many
areas, although plaintiffs would have to show that elections follow this pattern as a part
of showing that they can form a swing vote.
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that served minority interests. If the white bloc defeats the minority group despite redistricting, then redistricting does not
remedy plaintiffs' injury. In this situation, redistricting would not
change candidates' incentives to ignore minority interests.
To succeed in an influence claim based on white bloc voting,
plaintiffs must show that bloc voting could be overcome, at least
partially, so that some of their interests will be addressed. For
example, plaintiffs can show that the crossover voting that does
exist would be sufficient to allow the minority group greater
influence once redistricting increases its population. Alternatively, plaintiffs can present evidence that redistricting would facilitate the forming of coalitions or make existing coalitions more
effective. There may be other evidence that would show the requisite difference in influence. Because voting-rights cases are fact
intensive, the above examples do not exhaust the possibilities.
The important point is that plaintiffs must show that some concrete difference exists; plaintiffs cannot merely rest on the assumption that a larger percentage of the population would wield
more influence and that therefore the challenged districting plan
violates the VRA.
D. The Fourth Prong: Would Redistricting, on the Whole,
Advance Minority Interests Across All Districts Affected?
Influence claims are complicated by the fact that increased
influence in one district likely means decreased influence in another. Thus, shifting the minority group's population, even
though it may increase influence in one district, may not advance
minority voting rights as a whole. Which allocation of influence
best furthers minority voting rights remains unclear. For this
reason, courts should defer to the state's districting decision if
the state shows that the decision was both reasonable and done
in a good faith effort to protect minority voting rights.
Thus, this prong involves a shifting burden of proof. Initially,
plaintiffs must show that their proposed redistricting will increase the aggregate minority influence. If the proposed redistricting will decrease minority influence in other districts, a gain
in the proposed "influential" minority district must compensate
for this decrease. For instance, if the minority group in the "losing district"--the district with a reduced minority population-sacrifices little influence, because it had virtually none
initially, a demonstrable increase in influence in the "gaining district" would compensate for this loss.
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Armour is an example of a case where redistricting would
benefit the voting power of minorities on the whole. In Armour,
the ratio of minorities in the two districts at issue would have
been changed from 35:65 to about 1:99."4 Thus, redistricting
would have benefitted 99 percent of the minorities across the two
districts. It is unlikely that the remaining 1 percent's loss of influence would outweigh the benefit to the other 99 percent. This
is especially true because, under the challenged districting
scheme, none of the minorities had any significant influence. 5
However, courts should presume that the challenged
districting is valid if either of two situations exist: (1) if the state
demonstrates that it purposefully districted to create a beneficial
allocation of minority influence for purposes of the VRA; or (2) if
the minorities in the losing district object to their loss of influence under the plaintiffs proposed redistricting. Although courts
will presume the districting to be valid in either of these circumstances, plaintiffs can overcome this presumption. For example,
plaintiffs can counter the state's demonstration of good faith. To
do so, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the state's actual motive was not to further minority interests. The state's demonstration puts motive at issue and thus differs from the usual
VRA claim in which the state's intent is irrelevant. Plaintiffs
need not demonstrate that the state intended the districting to
reduce minority influence. They need to show only that the state
did not intend to protect minority voting rights.
Alternatively, plaintiffs can counter the state's assertion that
it districted reasonably. To do this, plaintiffs must show that the
state's conclusion that redistricting will not advance minority
rights on the whole is unreasonable. Thus, there is a different
standard of proof with regard to the effects of the districting if
plaintiffs choose to attack the state's reasonableness claim. Instead of having to show, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that redistricting would advance minority interests, plaintiffs must now show that it would be unreasonable to conclude
that redistricting would not have this effect."° Plaintiffs must

104

Armour, 775 F Supp at 1047-48. The numbers offered by the court reveal that if re-

districted, one district would reduce from 11.11 percent to about 0.87 percent African-

American, whereas the other would increase from 24.96 percent to about 35.9 percent
African-American.

0o' Id at 1059.
Whether this standard becomes "fatal in fact," essentially defeating all influence-

1"6

dilution claims, depends on how courts apply it. It is intended that, just as it is possible to

demonstrate that a lower court's decision was clearly erroneous on an appeal, it should be
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also show unreasonableness to overcome an objection to the
plaintiffs proposed redistricting by minorities in the "losing district."
IV. THE PROPOSED STANDARDS RESPOND TO OBJECTIONS
AGAINST INFLUENCE-DILUTION CLAIMS

These standards address the concerns that have driven
courts to seek a bright-line rule. Allowing influence-dilution
claims subject to these standards does not threaten a flood of
marginal claims. Thus, applying these standards will not prevent
valid claims from being redressed. In addition, applying these
standards provides some measure of security from frivolous
claims to states that draw district lines in good faith.
A. The Proposed Standards Will Halt a Potential Flood of
Litigation
Some courts are concerned that without a bright-line, prophylactic rule, they will be flooded with marginal claims."°7 Although the proposed standards do not provide a bright line, they
will stem this tide. The fourth prong will enable courts to dismiss
many claims, especially given the required deference to the current districting scheme, if the state shows that it acted reasonably and in good faith to abide by the VRA. °5 The third prong
will reduce the potential for frivolous claims by requiring that
representatives under the current districting scheme be unresponsive."
B. The Proposed Standards Will Not Leave States Perpetually
Vulnerable to VRA Claims
Another concern is that without a bright-line rule, states will
not be able to draw districts that they are confident do not violate the VRA. Arguably, the Thornburg v Gingles"0 50 percent
requirement enabled politicians to know what they had to do to
succeed against VRA challenges. Absent this bright line, politicians may be perpetually vulnerable, and courts may find it
difficult to fashion remedies."' The 50 percent requirement
possible for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a districting decision was unreasonable.
1o7 See notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
10 See notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
10 See notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
11o 478 US 30 (1986).
. See Hastert v State Bd. of Elections, 777 F Supp 634, 653 (N D Ill 1991)(expressing
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gives direction as to what needs to be done-create a district

with at least 50 percent minority voters.
These concerns, however, are overstated. Allowing influence
claims subject to the proposed standards will not make politi-

cians inordinately insecure. The deference called for in the fourth
prong ensures that as long as states district reasonably and in
good faith with regard to voting rights considerations, they will
be safe from challenges based on influence dilution.
Admittedly, however, allowing influence claims will make
politicians' and courts' jobs somewhat more difficult. But this fact
does not necessarily mean these claims should go unrecognized.
Certainly it is easier to district if one ignores voting rights entirely. The vulnerability of these rights means politicians and courts
must be that much more careful to perform their jobs responsibly.
C.

A Note on Maximization Concerns

Lack of a bright-line, prophylactic rule may not be at the
heart of the concern regarding the flood of marginal claims. Rather, the concern may stem from the lack of a benchmark to determine how much influence minority voters should have." In
other words, even if redistricting can increase a minority group's

concerns regarding influence districts generally, the court stated that without the 50 percent line "relief becomes a truly perplexing issue necessarily requiring a court to resort to
vague, subjective criteria").
11 See Turner v Arkansas, 784 F Supp 553, 572 (E D Ark 1991)(expressing concern
that allowing claims for influence dilution would effectively turn the VRA into an affirmative action statute, asking, "How do... plaintiffs... contend that [the challenged
districting] results in [African-American] voters having less opportunity to participate or
to elect? 'Less' assumes some benchmark. Less than what?"). The Turner court concluded
that the benchmark must be the amount of voting opportunity that plaintiffs had immediately before implementation of a challenged practice. But this cannot be right. If it were,
it would allow consciously racist districting that intentionally diluted minority voting
power to remain intact for the simple reason that it was initially created 30 or 40 years
ago. Under this rule, because the legislature made no change for the worse when it
retained those districts in 1990, no VRA claim existed. See Hastert, 777 F Supp at 654 n
33.
The idea that at some point a group is just too small to have a claim reflects the
question of how much influence such small groups should expect to have in the first place.
While the benchmark question remains open for both influence and ability-to-elect claims,
it may alleviate some of these concerns to remember that it will be more difficult for such
small groups to meet their burden of proving that redistricting will significantly increase
their influence.
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influence, it is difficult to discern when the challenged districting
scheme causes a legal injury by diluting the minority group's
influence and when the minority group is merely seeking more
influence.
The same problem exists in ability-to-elect claims. In Johnson v De Grandy,"' the Supreme Court stated that vote-dilution claims may not be made merely to "maximize" minority
voting power. 114 In order for plaintiffs to state a claim, it is not
enough to show that it is possible to create more majority-minority districts; plaintiffs must also show that the challenged practice
injured them by disproportionately limiting the number of representatives they were able to elect."'
In De Grandy, the Court held that evidence of "proportionality" proved that plaintiffs' claim was to maximize their influence,
rather than to remedy an injury.' Because the number of majority-minority districts was proportional to the number of minority voters in the state, no evidence existed that minorities suffered vote dilution or that the current districting scheme tended
to perpetuate a history of systematic discrimination." 7 While
the court denied that proportionality could insulate a state from
VRA challenges, proportionality was at least identified as one
factor relevant to determining whether vote-dilution claims are
for maximization or for redress of a legitimate injury.'
It would be quite different to apply proportionality to
influence-dilution claims. There may only be crude ways to distinguish between maximization and redress of harm in the influence context. One possibility is to require that plaintiffs demonstrate that only a minimal amount of minority influence exists
under the challenged districting scheme. A form of this requirement is incorporated into the third prong of the proposed test.
Plaintiffs must show that, under the challenged scheme, elected
officials tend to be unresponsive to minority interests. This test is
based on the notion that a minority group that would otherwise
have at least some of its interests addressed, and some measure
of political representation, should not be left virtually unrepresented because of poor districting.

114 S Ct 2647 (1994).
Johnson v De Grandy, 114 S Ct 2647, 2659-60 (1994).
115 Id.
116Id at 2658-60.
11

114

17

Id at 2660.

"8 De Grandy, 114 S Ct at 2660.
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CONCLUSION
Legitimate concerns drive courts' general reluctance to recognize VRA claims for influence dilution. The proposed test, however, addresses these concerns by creating standards to assess
alleged injury to a minority group's political influence. These
standards are designed to detect when districting has
impermissibly diluted minority voters' influence. Under the proposed standards, plaintiffs must show that: (1) the challenged
districting scheme unnecessarily split a cohesive minority group;
(2) either white bloc voting usually defeats candidates who represent minority interests, or minority influence is so negligible that
no white bloc exists; (3) redistricting could provide minority voters with a demonstrable increase in electoral influence in place of
a scheme where candidates tend to be unresponsive; and (4)
redistricting would, on the whole, advance minority interests
across all districts affected. This test allows courts to remedy
influence dilution-an important yet generally unrecognized
harm to minority voting rights. At the same time, this standard
limits marginal claims through a sensitivity to the voting rights
of minorities in all relevant districts and a recognition that it is
not always clear which districting plan best furthers minority
voting rights.

